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THE HEALTH ACT'S FDA DEFENSE TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES: A GIFT TO DRUG MAKERS OR TO
THE PUBLIC?
Elissa Levy*
We thus come to the issue of punitive damages, an issue of extreme
significance not only in monetary terms to this defendant in view of the
hundreds of pending.., actions and to the plaintiff as well, but from a
longer range, to the entire pharmaceutical industry and to all present and
potential users of drugs.I
INTRODUCTION
Despite rigorous regulation by the United States Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA"), pharmaceuticals are indirectly co-regulated by the
tort litigation system. 2 While the FDA uses its scientific expertise to make
public health determinations of whether therapeutic benefits outweigh the
risks of individual drugs, lay judges and jurors are afforded the opportunity
to second-guess these decisions and regulate through the imposition of
compensatory and punitive damage awards.3 Concerned commentators
contend that this dual regulation system has driven valuable drugs from the
market and potentially keeps innovative drugs from reaching the market
altogether. 4 Moreover, they argue that the mere availability of a punitive
damages claim in pharmaceutical litigation possibly increases litigation
costs for manufacturers and leads to a greater likelihood of settlements. 5
These commentators suggest that despite the general rule that regulatory
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law; M.D., Mount Sinai School of
Medicine, 1999; B.A., Emory University, 1994. I would like to thank my husband Mitch,
my parents Lesly and Jay, my in-laws Harriet and Harold, and of course, Ralph and
Solomon, for all their love, support, and encouragement. I would also like to thank
Professor Benjamin Zipursky for his thoughtful advice and guidance with this Note.
1. Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly,
J.). Although Judge Henry Friendly wrote this almost forty years ago, this statement remains
relevant today.
2. See Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 Geo. L.J. 2049, 2074-
85 (2000).
3. See Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless
Punitive Damage Awards on Pharmaceutical Development and Availability, 45 Food Drug
Cosm. L.J. 693, 697-98 (1990).
4. Id. at 698-704 (describing the impact of liability and punitive damages awards on
specific pharmaceuticals, including vaccines, contraceptives, and Bendectin).
5. Id. at 697.
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compliance is not a defense to liability, compliance with FDA regulations
should shield drug manufacturers from punitive damage awards. 6
Other commentators challenge these claims and state that FDA
regulations merely establish minimum safety standards; FDA compliance,
they argue, does not preclude liability.7 Concerned that the FDA fails to
adequately protect the public from unacceptable risks, these commentators
suggest that punitive damages are necessary to punish and deter
manufacturer misconduct. 8
On July 28, 2005, the House of Representatives passed the Help
Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare ("HEALTH") Act of
2005, which includes an FDA regulatory compliance defense to punitive
damages. 9 This controversial provision has become a perennial, repeatedly
included in legislation that passes in the House, but stalls in the Senate. 10
This Note argues that because of the unique societal importance of
pharmaceuticals, and the comprehensiveness of FDA regulations, public
policy weighs in favor of disallowing punitive damage awards in
pharmaceutical litigation where the manufacturer complied with FDA
regulations. In order to appreciate this issue fully, Part I of this Note will
provide background, briefly discussing pharmaceutical products liability,
punitive damages, and the tort reform movement. This part will also
discuss the co-regulation of pharmaceuticals by the FDA and the tort
system, including brief descriptions of the regulatory compliance defense
and preemption.
Parts II.A and II.B explain the arguments for and against the FDA
regulatory compliance defense to punitive damages in pharmaceutical
products liability lawsuits.
Finally, Part III of this Note concludes that because of the strong public
interest in the availability of life-sustaining and life-improving drugs, public
policy favors federal legislation immunizing compliant manufacturers from
punitive damages in the absence of an FDA determination of fraud. Part III
suggests that, in order to ensure public health and safety, the enactment of
this defense should be accompanied by the reworking of FDA regulations
6. See, e.g., id. at 708; Annette L. Marthaler, Comment, The FDA Defense: A
Prescription for Easing the Pain of Punitive Damage Awards in Medical Products Liability
Cases, 19 Hamline L. Rev. 451, 486-87 (1996).
7. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 260 (2003).
8. See Christopher Placitella & Justin Klein, The Civil Justice System Bridges the Great
Divide in Consumer Protection, 43 Duq. L. Rev. 219, 233-34 (2005).
9. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005,
H.R. 5, 109th Cong. § 7(c) (2005) (as passed by the House of Representatives, July 28, 2005,
and referred to the Comm. on the Judiciary). The HEALTH Act of 2005 passed the House
of Representatives by a margin of 230 to 194. See Final Vote Results for Role Call 449,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/rol1449.xml (last visited Feb. 27, 2006). Because there is no
House Report for the HEALTH Act of 2005, the views of the bill's proponents and
opponents are based on the HEALTH Act of 2003's House Report. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-
32 (2003).
10. See, e.g., HEALTH Act of 2004, H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. § 7(c) (2004); HEALTH
Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. § 7(c) (2003).
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and sanctions. This part also addresses possible consequences of the FDA
regulatory compliance defense to punitive damages, such as the increase in
economic damage awards.
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE CO-REGULATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS
This part provides the setting necessary for discussing the conflict in Part
II over the appropriateness of the FDA regulatory compliance defense to
punitive damages. Part L.A briefly discusses pharmaceutical products
liability, punitive damages, and the tort reform movement. Part I.B
examines the co-regulation of pharmaceuticals, including ex ante regulation
by the FDA and ex post liability imposed by the tort system.
A. Pharmaceutical Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and the Tort
Reform Movement
The current movement to reform the tort system was preceded by the
1960s and 1970s plaintiff-friendly expansion of tort rights and liabilities.I'
After a couple of influential products liability opinions 12 and the American
Law Institute's issuance of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 13 plaintiffs' barriers to recovery were reduced by courts holding
manufacturers strictly liable for injuries caused by their products. 14 The
11. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 479, 483-88
(1990) (describing the pro-plaintiff expansion of products liability rights in the 1960's); John
T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort
Retrenchment, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1021, 1021-35 (2005) (concluding that the tort reform
movement is reacting to the pro-plaintiff expansion of tort rights).
12. See Justice Roger Traynor's concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), and majority opinion in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
13. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
14. Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola, 150 P.2d at 440, and majority opinion in
Greenman, 377 P.2d at 897, marked the emergence of strict liability for defective products.
Just a couple of years after Greenman, the American Law Institute recommended the
adoption of strict products liability in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
See John C. P. Goldberg, Anthony J. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law:
Responsibilities and Redress 815-16 (2004). The overwhelming majority of states have
since employed some fashion of strict products liability law. Id. at 815, 832. In general,
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rationales cited for the shift from a negligence standard to a standard of
strict liability include (1) obligation; (2) deterrence; (3) compensation
insurance; (4) causation strict liability; (5) compensation equality; (6)
litigation structure; and (7) judicial candor. 15  In theory, strict liability
deters manufacturers from marketing unsafe products and fairly
compensates injured consumers. 16
Recognizing the risk of stifling the research and development of life-
sustaining and life-improving drugs, and the inevitability of harm, in
comment k to section 402A, the drafters of section 402A recommended
against strict liability for design defects in "unavoidably unsafe" products,
such as prescription drugs and vaccines. 17  Although it is generally
considered to be in the public's interest, in limited circumstances, to allow
"unsafe" products to be marketed when there is a net positive effect on
there is a tripartite classification for product defects: (1) manufacturing defects; (2) design
defects; and (3) failure to warn or instruct. Id. at 846-47.
15. These justifications can be found in Justice Traynor's concurrence in Escola. See
Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 14, at 823 (discussing Escola, 150 P.2d at 440
(Traynor, J., concurring)). For a further discussion of each of these rationales, see id.
16. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901.
17. Comment k to section 402A provides as follows:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present
state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An
outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not
uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.
Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and
the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high
degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and
accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the
like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of
many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and
opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety,
or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies
the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.
The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for
it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their
use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable
risk.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. k. In addition to comment k, other liability-
restrictive doctrines, such as the learned intermediary doctrine, and legislation, such as the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 (2000), have been crafted in
response to concerns about tort law's impact on medical products and public health. See
Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 14, at 900, 925, 937-38. In contrast to general
consumer products where warnings must be conveyed directly to the consumer, tort law
generally requires a drug manufacturer to provide instructions and warnings to the
prescribing medical provider. Id. at 937-38. The treating or prescribing medical provider,
known as the learned intermediary, is considered to be in the best position to make
individualized medical decisions based on the risks and benefits of the drug, and the nature
of the patient's condition. Id. Under this doctrine, it is the medical provider, not the
manufacturer, who will incur liability for failing to adequately warn the patient. Id.
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public health and safety, the interpretation of comment k varies among
jurisdictions. 18 The majority of jurisdictions apply comment k on a case-
by-case basis, contending that societal interests can be served without
providing manufacturers "blanket immunity" from strict liability for
prescription drugs. 19 Because of the protection afforded to manufacturers
by comment k, few pharmaceutical products liability cases involve design
defect claims-most involve the failure to warn of known or reasonably
knowable risks, and the adequacy of warnings provided. 20
The expansion of tort liability is intertwined with the expansion of the
punitive damages remedy against product manufacturers. 21 No longer were
punitive damage awards limited to malicious malfeasance; rather, the
remedy became available to deter and punish product manufacturers for
reckless indifference. 22 While punitive damages have been a constant
18. See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 836 (Neb. 2000)
(applying a case-by-case application of comment k of section 402A and rejecting section
6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts). Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
which specifically pertains to prescription drug and medical device design defect claims, has
received much criticism for its tendency to favor defendants. See id. at 837-40.
19. See id. at 836. For a discussion of the appropriateness of the comment k defense, see
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470,476-77 (Cal. 1988).
20. See Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The
Respective Roles of Regulation and Tort Law, 42 St. Louis U. L.J. 163, 168 (1998). Most
failure-to-warn claims concern adverse events that are not detected during clinical trials and
are only identified after Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval. Id. at 169.
Manufacturing defect claims are rare in pharmaceutical products liability litigation because
of the FDA's strict manufacturing regulations and the technological capabilities of
manufacturers. Id. at 168. Generally, in a cause of action for strict liability premised on
failure to warn, a plaintiff only needs to prove that "the defendant did not adequately warn of
a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and
prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and
distribution." Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Cal. 1996). One commentator
even claims that comment k itself "steered plaintiffs to the most prominent theory in
pharmaceutical litigation: the inadequate warning or failure to warn claim." W. Kip Viscusi
et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437, 1463 (1994). For cases
permitting recovery for a strict liability claim based on the theory that the drug was
defectively designed, see Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1981), and Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915 (Kan. 1990).
21. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in
Disguise, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 19-24 (1995). Punitive damages, also called "exemplary" or
"vindictive" damages, are imposed to deter and punish wrongful conduct, and to compensate
injured plaintiffs. Viscusi et al., supra note 20, at 1455-56. They have the potential to have
an over-deterrent effect, and are often not needed to compensate a plaintiff who received
compensatory damages. Id. In addition, commentators argue that the imposition of punitive
damages against corporate entities provides neither punishment nor deterrence. See Lisa
Litwiller, From Exxon to Engle: The Futility of Assessing Punitive Damages as Against
Corporate Entities, 57 Rutgers L. Rev. 301, 301-02 (2004). For an overview of punitive
damages and a discussion of the recent constitutional changes to punitive damages awards,
see id at 302-20.
22. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 21, at 22. During the nineteenth century, punitive
damages were primarily limited to intentional torts. Id. at 18. The Restatement (Second)
states that the purpose of punitive damages is
to punish the person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him and others from
similar conduct in the future. Although the purposes are the same, the effect of a
2006] 2429
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feature of American jurisprudence, their imposition against corporations has
caused significant debate over their legitimacy. 23  Despite numerous
empirical studies concluding that punitive damage awards are infrequent, 24
and recent judicial and legislative constraints on their recovery, 25 concerns
about punitive damages dominate contemporary tort reform debates. 26
Controversy surrounding such punitive damage awards in pharmaceutical
litigation is best illustrated by two early, oft-cited cases: Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc.27 and Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.28 In
Roginsky and Toole, plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of MER/29, a
cholesterol lowering drug, for compensatory and punitive damages after
developing cataracts allegedly caused by the drug.29 The plaintiffs alleged
that the manufacturer disregarded animal studies showing the drug's
cataractogenic effects, misrepresented the drug's safety profile to the FDA,
and failed to issue appropriate warnings or to withdraw the drug from the
market based on its known risks.30 In both cases, juries awarded the
plaintiffs compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, the punitive
damages award was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in Roginsky,31 but upheld by the California Court of Appeals in
Toole.
32
civil judgment for punitive damages is not the same at [sic] that of a fine imposed
after a conviction of a crime, since the successful plaintiff and not the state is
entitled to the money required to be paid by the defendant.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 cmt. a (1979).
23. See Goldberg, Sebok & Zipursky, supra note 14, at 470 (explaining that
"contemporary critics argue that punitive awards threaten the vitality of the economy and
empower undeserving plaintiffs and their lawyers to extract 'windfalls' from corporate
defendants").
24. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 745 (2002). Although it is widely accepted that
punitive damages awards are rare, punitive damages awards totaled approximately $150
million in 1993 and $30 billion in 2002. Litwiller, supra note 21, at 320. Moreover,
commentators claim that their imposition is often unpredictable and arbitrary, potentially
overdeterring desirable activity. See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade,
Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L.J.
2071, 2084, 2111-14 (1998). In addition, fear of punitive damages awards may lead
manufacturers to settle even weak claims. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 21, at 46 ("The
potential for future punitive damages awards by thousands of other claimants was
undoubtedly a key motivator for firms to join the global settlement of breast implant
claims.").
25. See Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1297, 1300 (2005) (describing substantive and procedural tort reforms that constrain
the punitive damages remedy, such as punitive damages caps, bifurcating the determination
of the amount of punitive damages from the other portions of the trial, raising the burden of
proof, designating a portion of the punitive damages award to the state, and restricting use of
corporate wealth evidence).
26. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 24, at 744.
27. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
28. 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (Ct. App. 1967).
29. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 832; Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04.
30. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 832; Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403-08.
31. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 835.
32. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 414-16.
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In Roginsky, Judge Henry Friendly looked "to the entire pharmaceutical
industry and to all present and potential users of drugs" and found that
punitive damages were inappropriate in light of the hundreds of pending
MER/29 actions. 33  Acknowledging "the negligent-even highly
negligent-manufacture and sale of [MER/29]," Judge Friendly held that
the criminal penalties and compensatory damages recoverable would
sufficiently meet the objectives of deterrence and social disapproval. 34
Punitive damages in such cases would have deleterious effects on
manufacturers and the consuming public. 35 Recognizing but failing to
follow the Roginsky decision, the court in Toole held that a jury could have
found that the manufacturer acted "recklessly and in wanton disregard of
possible harm to others," supporting a finding of the malice necessary for
the imposition of a punitive damages award.36
Because of the uncertainty of this increased tort liability, as demonstrated
by Roginsky and Toole, insurance premiums rose and pharmaceutical
manufacturers were forced to reevaluate their businesses, either
withdrawing drugs from the market or leaving the market altogether. 37 For
example, in 1983, Bendectin, the only drug approved to treat the nausea and
vomiting associated with pregnancy, was voluntarily pulled from the
market because multimillion dollar products liability claims resulted in
skyrocketing insurance premiums.38 At the same time, ten of the thirteen
manufacturers of childhood vaccines fled the American market because of
rising insurance premiums and the cost associated with defending against
lawsuits. 39
Concerned about the effect that increased liability with standardless
punitive damage awards has on pharmaceutical manufacturers, and in turn,
on the consuming public, courts, commentators, interest groups, and
legislatures have attempted to alter the tort system for more than two
decades.40 In 1986, Congress responded to the vaccine liability crisis by
creating a no-fault compensation system for childhood vaccine-related
injuries.41 The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program removes
vaccine injury claims out of the tort system and into a Vaccine Claims
33. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 838.
34. Id. at 840-4 1.
35. Id. at 841 (stating that the cost of large punitive damage awards will be passed onto
consumers and may ultimately cause business to shut down).
36. Toole, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 416 & n.3. The court in Toole did not address the overall
impact of punitive damages in pharmaceutical products liability actions.
37. See Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental
Principles Supporting Tort Reform, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 645, 648-54 (2003).
38. See id. at 653.
39. See id. at 650.
40. See Green, supra note 20, at 164. For an in-depth discussion of the controversial
political nature of the tort reform movement, see Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 11, at
1026-35.
41. See La Fetra, supra note 37, at 677-78 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 99-908, at 1, 4, 6-7
(1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6287, 6344, 6345, 6347-48).
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Court, where the complainants' burdens are eased in exchange for a limited
compensation of up to $250,000.42
Although Congress responded to the negative effects of products liability
litigation on the vaccine industry, there has been no similar federal
legislation for prescription drugs. Seeking to provide greater certainty as to
manufacturers' responsibilities, encourage innovation, and ensure
appropriate redress for injured parties, tort reform supporters call for a
uniform, national standard in pharmaceutical products liability.43
Specifically, because the FDA's regulation of pharmaceuticals is generally
considered to be the most stringent of all government safety regulations, 44
supporters of tort reform recommend a tort defense that would at least
preclude punitive damages when manufacturers comply with FDA
regulations.45  While several state legislatures have enacted such
legislation,46 and the House of Representatives has repeatedly passed
similar legislation, such efforts have consistently stalled in the Senate.
B. The Co-regulation of Pharmaceuticals
This part discusses the current dual-track system of ex ante regulation of
pharmaceuticals by the FDA and ex post liability imposed by the tort
system. It also outlines current state legislation that incorporates the FDA
regulatory compliance defense, and describes the FDA regulatory
compliance defense included in the HEALTH Act of 2005.
1. FDA Ex Ante Regulation
Before a manufacturer can market a new drug, the drug is scrutinized
under the FDA's comprehensive drug approval process. 47 Pursuant to the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA"), and its
implementing regulations, the FDA ensures that each new drug that is
introduced or delivered into interstate commerce meets the statutory
standard for safety and efficacy, and that the benefits of the drug outweigh
42. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11, -15
(2000). For a detailed discussion of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, see
Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986:
An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 387 (1987).
43. See Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 707-08; Viscusi et al., supra note 20, at
1438-39.
44. See Green, supra note 20, at 163 ("To a greater degree than virtually any other
consumer product, pharmaceuticals are subjected to rigorous regulatory control." (citation
omitted)).
45. See Am. Law Inst., 2 Reporters' Study: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal
Injury 83-110 (1991) [hereinafter ALl Study].
46. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-701 (2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-64-302.5(5)(a)
(2004); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.80(c)(1)
(LexisNexis 2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.927 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-2 (2002).
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314 (2004).
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the risks for its intended use and intended population. 48 Because it is
impossible to anticipate all effects of a drug during pre-market trials, post-
marketing surveillance, through clinical trials, observational studies, and
spontaneous adverse event reports, is a critical aspect of the process. 49
The costly and time-consuming FDA evaluation process50 begins when
the manufacturer submits an investigational new drug application
("IND").5  The IND process for a previously untested drug typically
consists of three phases of clinical trials.52 During phase I studies, the drug
is administered to patients or healthy volunteers to determine side effects
and establish the dosage at which the drug can be taken without a high
incidence of these adverse events.53 If phase I studies include patients with
the condition that the drug is intended to treat, it may be possible to gain
preliminary efficacy data.54 Phase II trials include well-controlled clinical
studies to determine the drug's short-term side effects and the efficacy for
its indicated use in patients with the condition or disease. 55 Finally, after
preliminary studies suggest that the drug is effective, phase III trials are
conducted with a large number of patients to provide the necessary safety
and efficacy information to allow the FDA to make an overall risk-benefit
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355; 21 C.F.R. § 314. Congress's primary goal in enacting the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA") was "to protect consumers from
dangerous products." United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948). Prior to the
Kefauver-Harris amendments to the FDCA, manufacturers were only required to
demonstrate drug safety, not efficacy. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781,
76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355).
49. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80. The FDA recently announced new initiatives to strengthen
drug safety-the November 2004 Five-Step Plan and the February 2005 Drug Safety
Announcement. See Drug Safety: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th
Cong. (2005) (statement of Steven Galson, Acting Director of the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2005/drugsafety0505.html
[hereinafter Galson Testimony]. These plans were developed to better identify drugs with
unacceptable risk profiles and to "promote a culture of transparency, openness, and enhanced
oversight within the Agency." Id.
50. See PhRMA, Innovation, http://www.phrma.org/innovation (last visited Jan. 26,
2006) (stating that the average research and development time for a drug is fifteen years and
costs the manufacturer over $800 million). But see Marcia Angell, The Truth About Drug
Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to Do About It 40-41 (2004) (disputing the
$800 million figure and claiming that the average after-tax cost for the research and
development per drug is closer to $100 million to $300 million).
51. 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2005). The application generally should include the results of
extensive animal toxicity studies. See id. § 312.23(a)(3)(iv)(f). On January 12, 2006, the
FDA announced a plan to make clinical drug development more efficient by allowing earlier
human studies before phase 1 begins. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA
Issues Advice to Make Earliest Stages of Clinical Drug Development More Efficient (Jan.
26, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2006/NEW01296.html. This
will enable researchers to identify sooner which experimental drugs have a chance to be
brought to the market. See id.
52. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21.
53. Id. § 312.21(a).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 312.21(b).
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determination. 56 In addition, the results of the phase III trials are used to
determine the essential information to appear on the drug package label.57
Once the IND process is complete, the drug manufacturer analyzes the
data and submits a new drug application ("NDA") to the FDA. 58 As part of
the NDA, the manufacturer must provide: (1) reports of investigations
conducted to determine the drug's safety and efficacy; (2) a list of the
drug's components; (3) a statement of the drug's composition; (4) a
description of the drug's manufacturing, processing, and packing process;
(5) samples of the drug and its components; and (6) the proposed labeling
for the drug.59
The FDA strictly regulates the content and format of all sections of a
drug's label,60 informing the manufacturer of the specific labeling
requirements in an "approvable" 61 or "approval" 62 letter. Approval of the
NDA is "conditioned upon the applicant incorporating the specified
labeling changes exactly as directed, and upon the applicant submitting to
FDA a copy of the final printed labeling prior to marketing." 63
After the FDA approves the NDA, the manufacturer has a continuing
obligation to report to the FDA adverse drug experiences and additional
safety-related information as they become available. 64 In addition, the
manufacturer is required to submit annual reports to the FDA that include
all new safety and efficacy information obtained during the previous year,
and describe actions taken in response to the newly acquired information. 65
During the post-marketing monitoring stage of a newly approved drug,
the FDA continuously evaluates the frequency and seriousness of adverse
events. 66  The FDA's response to the information "depends on an
56. Id. § 312.21(c).
57. Id.
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000).
59. Id. § 355(b)(1). The term "labeling" includes the claims about the drug's risks and
benefits, usage directions, and all of the written material printed on or accompanying the
drug. See Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
60. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57 (2004). "Drug labeling serves as the standard under which
FDA determines whether a product is safe and effective." 50 Fed. Reg. 7452-01, 7470 (Feb.
22, 1985). To improve patient safety, the FDA recently made a major revision to the format
of prescription drug information on the "package insert." See Press Release, U.S. Food &
Drug Admin., FDA Announces New Prescription Drug Information Format to Improve
Patient Safety (Jan. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/NEW01272.html. Drug information will be
required to be in a more easy-to-read format and will be more accessible with electronic
resources. Id.
61. 21 C.F.R. § 314.110(a) (2004). An "approvable" letter indicates that the new drug
application ("NDA") is "basically approvable" pending the resolution of certain issues. Id.
62. Id. § 314.105. The FDA will send an "approval" letter only if there are minor
deficiencies in the proposed labeling. Id. § 314.105(b).
63. Id. § 314.105(b).
64. See id. § 314.80(c).
65. Id. § 314.81(b)(2)(i).
66. Prescription Drug Safety: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Sandra L. Kweder, Deputy Director,
Office of New Drugs, FDA) [hereinafter Kweder Testimony].
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evaluation of the aggregate public health benefit of the product compared to
its evolving risk profile."67  Based on this information, the FDA may
withdraw its approval "upon finding imminent hazard to public health," or
require the manufacturer to make changes to the drug's label. 68 To quickly
and easily provide safety information to patients and healthcare
professionals, the FDA recently launched a new website devoted to drug
safety.69 In addition, MedWatch, another FDA website, issues alerts to
doctors and patients about emerging or potential safety risks associated with
FDA-approved products.70  These websites also allow consumers and
healthcare professionals to report problems believed to be associated with
FDA-approved drugs. 71  Violation of FDA regulations subjects
manufacturers to criminal and civil penalties. 72
2. Ex Post Regulation by the Tort System
In addition to extensive FDA regulation, judicial decision makers co-
regulate pharmaceuticals through case-by-case analysis under the products
liability tort system. Focusing on a specific injury suffered by an individual
plaintiff, lay judges and juries routinely impose liability on pharmaceutical
manufacturers whose products comply with the FDA's risk-benefit-based
regulatory requirements.73  Pharmaceutical manufacturers and
commentators argue that compliance with FDA regulations should preclude
tort liability; the responses by Congress, state legislatures, and the courts
vary.
a. Regulatory Compliance Defense
To fully appreciate the controversy surrounding the regulatory
compliance defense, this section will provide an overview of the treatment
of this defense both in general and specifically related to the FDA. This
section will also compare the regulatory compliance defense to a similar,
but fundamentally distinct tort law defense: federal preemption.
67. Id.
68. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2000).
69. See FDA's New Drug Safety Initiative, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drugsafety.htm (last
visited Jan. 25, 2006).
70. See MedWatch, The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting
Program, http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/index.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
71. Id.
72. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-337 (2000).
73. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability:
Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 Geo. L.J. 2167, 2173-75 (2000).
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i. General Regulatory Compliance
Ever since a railroad grade-crossing collision case in 1892, 74 it is
fundamental law that compliance with relevant government safety statutes
and regulations is admissible and relevant to a product's defectiveness, but
does not preclude manufacturer liability or a finding of a product's
defectiveness. 75 In keeping with this traditional view, section 4(b) of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts provides,
[A] product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether
the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by
the statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a
matter of law a finding of product defect.76
Moreover, in a comment to section 4, the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) reiterate the widely accepted rule that government safety statutes
and regulations establish a minimum safety floor below which the product
is deemed defective, and the manufacturer may be held liable.77 Although
many commentators 78 and the majority of courts 79 espouse the traditional
Restatement rule that compliance with safety regulations is not dispositive,
commentators have recently focused on a qualifier within the commentary
to Section 4 of the Restatement (Third) that would allow courts, in certain
74. See Grand Trunk Ry. Co. of Can. v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408 (1892) (holding that
compliance with the railroad commissioner's safety regulations does not preclude a jury
finding of negligence).
75. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b) (1998); David G. Owen,
Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 14-17 (2005); Rabin,
supra note 2, at 2049-51.
76. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b). However, noncompliance
with product safety statutes or regulations is defectiveness per se. Id. § 4(a).
77. Comment e to section 4, in relevant part provides,
Subsection (b) reflects the traditional view that the standards set by most product
safety statutes or regulations generally are only minimum standards. Thus, most
product safety statutes or regulations establish a floor of safety below which
product sellers fall only at their peril, but they leave open the question of whether a
higher standard of product safety should be applied. This is the general rule,
applicable in most cases.
Id. § 4 cmt. e.
78. See, e.g., Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the
Specter of Tort Liability, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1026, 1048-54 (1989) (book review) (stating
that the regulations established by governmental regulatory agencies are not conclusive
because these agencies are often underfunded, influenced by politics and special interest
groups, and only establish minimum standards).
79. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 625 A.2d 1066, 1070 (N.J. 1993) (holding that
FDA regulations are merely minimum standards that "did not preclude Lederle from taking
additional action"); Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 303 (Okla. 1997) (finding that
the FDA sets minimum safety standards as to drug warnings and design). But see Ramirez v.
Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993). In Ramirez, the court adopted the FDA's
determination that English-only drug labeling is adequate, stating, "[l]acking the procedure
and the resources to conduct the relevant inquiries, we conclude that the prudent course is to
adopt for tort purposes the existing legislative and administrative standard of care on this
issue." Id. at 176.
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circumstances, to find that compliance with particular safety statutes or
regulations precludes liability. 80 This commentary states,
Occasionally, after reviewing relevant circumstances, a court may
properly conclude that a particular product safety standard set by statute
or regulation adequately serves the objectives of tort law and therefore
that the product that complies with the standard is not defective as a
matter of law. Such a conclusion may be appropriate when the safety
statute or regulation was promulgated recently, thus supplying currency to
the standard therein established; when the specific standard addresses the
very issue of product design or warning presented in the case before the
court; and when the court is confident that the deliberative process by
which the safety standard was established was full, fair, and thorough and
reflected substantial expertise. 81
The FDA's regulation of pharmaceuticals, commentators argue, fits within
this limited framework. 82
A similar, but principally distinct defense to state-law tort claims is
federal preemption.83 Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the
United States Constitution, federal statutes, including administrative
regulations,84 preempt conflicting state laws when: (1) Congress explicitly
includes a provision in the federal statute stating the intent to preempt state
law; (2) congressional intent to supersede state laws can be inferred from
the existence of a pervasive federal regulatory scheme; or (3) state law
actually conflicts with federal law to the extent that a party cannot comply
with both state and federal requirements. 85 Congressional intent, discerned
80. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 2051-52. In addition, Professor Rabin discusses a 1991
American Law Institute study that in limited circumstances supports a regulatory compliance
defense to tort liability. Id. at 2051 (citing ALl Study, supra note 45, at 83-110). Concerned
about the over-deterrent effect of socially valuable activities, the study recommends that for
particular products, such as pharmaceuticals, regulatory compliance, should at minimum, bar
punitive damages. See ALl Study, supra note 45, at 95, 110. For a further discussion of the
regulatory compliance defense recommended in the ALI Study, see Stewart, supra note 73,
at 2167-71. Professor Stewart supports regulatory compliance preclusion to both
compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 2167.
81. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 cmt. e.
82. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 2084 (cautiously supporting a regulatory compliance
defense for pharmaceuticals); see also Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The
Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 Geo. L.J. 2147, 2157 (2000) ("less
grudgingly" supporting a regulatory compliance defense for pharmaceuticals). But see
Owen, supra note 75, at 20-21 (arguing that because the FDA rarely fits a "perfect agency
model," determinations of a drug's defectiveness should not generally be based on FDA
safety regulations).
83. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 2053-54. Whereas the regulatory compliance defense is
a state-law defense concerning a court's adoption of the safety standards of the relevant
regulatory agency, preemption is a federal law defense where, when Congress intends, a
federal regulation overrides a state law. See Owen, supra note 75, at 13.
84. See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("Federal
regulations have no less pre-emptive effect than federal statutes.").
85. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
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from the language, structure, and purpose of the federal statute, is the
"'ultimate touchstone' in every pre-emption case."' 86
Because the FDCA does not contain an express preemption provision for
pharmaceuticals, 87 manufacturers typically argue solely for conflict
preemption.88 In analyzing conflict preemption of a state tort claim related
to matters of health and safety, a field traditionally occupied by the states,
courts begin their evaluation with the presumption against federal
preemption.89 Absent a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" to
supersede state regulations of health and safety matters, preemption will not
be found.90
ii. Legislative FDA Defense
Although not widespread, as part of the greater tort reform movement
over the past twenty years, the FDA regulatory compliance defense has
received moderate legislative support. Several states have enacted statutes
concerning a manufacturer's compliance with FDA regulations and
Congress has repeatedly considered the issue.
a. State Statutes
Concerned about the cost and availability of pharmaceuticals, a small
minority of state legislatures have enacted tort reform statutes that
recognize the FDA-compliance defense. 91  While a Michigan statute
provides complete immunity from tort liability for manufacturers whose
drug and drug labeling comply with FDA regulations, 92 this is not the norm.
Instead, the few states that recognize the FDA regulatory compliance
86. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n
v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
87. There is, however, an express preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendment
to the FDCA. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2000). Importantly, in January 2006, the FDA included
preemption language in the explanatory preamble of a new FDA drug-labeling rule. See
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314, 601). The preamble states that the FDA "believes" that its approval of a
drug's labeling "preempts conflicting or contrary State law." Id. Because the preemption
language is located in the preamble and not within codified regulatory text, however, its
future effect on judicial decisions is unclear. See Heather Won Tesoriero & Anna Wilde
Mathews, Lawyers May Change Their Tactics in Drug Liability Cases, Wall St. J., Jan. 19,
2006, at D3.
88. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (E.D. Tex. 2005)
(holding that federal law did not preempt a state failure-to-warn claim).
89. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 723 (1985)
(holding that local ordinances governing the collection of blood plasma were not preempted
by federal regulations governing the collection of blood plasma).
90. Id. at 715 (citation omitted).
91. See, e.g., Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2004)
(discussing the Michigan Legislature's rationale for enacting a statute that immunizes drug
manufacturers from liability if the drug and its labeling were approved by the FDA).
92. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000).
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defense generally only provide a statutory safe harbor for punitive damages
when a manufacturer complies with FDA regulations, 93 or provide a
rebuttable presumption that FDA-approved drug warnings are adequate. 94
Although these FDA-compliance statutes generally provide for an
exception where a pharmaceutical manufacturer knowingly misrepresents to
or withholds from the agency required information that is material and
relevant to the alleged harm,95 the viability of a cause of action based on
this exception is questionable after Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Committee.96  In Buckman, plaintiffs alleged that a medical device
manufacturer made fraudulent representations to the FDA while obtaining
FDA approval, and that those representations played a substantial role in
the plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 97 Stating that "[s]tate-law fraud-on-the-FDA
claims inevitably conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud
consistently with the Administration's judgment and objectives," the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-FDA claims were
impliedly preempted by the FDCA, as amended by the Medical Device
93. Arizona, Colorado, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah immunize drug
manufacturers from punitive damages so long as they complied with FDA regulations. See
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-701 (2003); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-64-302.5(5)(a) (2004); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.80(c)(1) (LexisNexis
2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.927(l)(a) (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-2(1) (2002). North
Dakota has a version of a general governmental regulatory defense (not specific to drugs)
that immunizes compliant manufacturers from punitive damages. See N.D. Cent. Code Ann.
§ 32-03.2-11(6) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2003).
94. New Jersey and Texas have such statutes. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-4 (West
2000); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.007 (Vernon 2005). Colorado provides a
rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective if it complies with relevant
government regulatory requirements. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(l)(b) (2004).
95. The New Jersey statute is typical, and provides as follows:
Punitive damages shall not be awarded if a drug or device or food or food
additive which caused the claimant's harm was subject to premarket approval or
licensure by the federal Food and Drug Administration under the "Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act," 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. or the "Public
Health Service Act," 58 Stat. 682, 42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. and was approved or
licensed; or is generally recognized as safe and effective pursuant to conditions
established by the federal Food and Drug Administration and applicable
regulations, including packaging and labeling regulations. However, where the
product manufacturer knowingly withheld or misrepresented information required
to be submitted under the agency's regulations, which information was material
and relevant to the harm in question, punitive damages may be awarded. For
purposes of this subsection, the terms "drug", "device", "food", and "food
additive" have the meanings defined in the "Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act."
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-5(c).
96. 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (holding that the plaintiffs' state-law fraud on the FDA
claims were impliedly preempted by the FDCA, as amended by the Medical Device
Amendments); see Garcia, 385 F.3d at 967 (holding that drug manufacturers enjoy
immunity from products liability absent an FDA determination of fraud); Kobar v. Novartis
Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1177 (D. Ariz. 2005) (finding that a state statute immunizing
drug manufacturers from punitive damages in products liability suits unless plaintiff proves
fraud on the FDA was preempted by federal law).
97. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 343.
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Amendments. 98 The Court observed that "complying with the FDA's
detailed regulatory regime in the shadow of 50 States' tort regimes will
dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants." 99 Moreover,
the Court held that the FDA itself is statutorily empowered to deter and
punish fraud-it regulates the approval process, can require additional
information from the manufacturer, investigate fraud, seek injunctive relief
and civil penalties, and pursue criminal prosecutions.°°
Lower courts have extended Buckman's reasoning to pharmaceuticals,
holding that state statutes immunizing manufacturers from liability unless
plaintiffs can prove fraud on the FDA are similarly preempted by federal
law.101 Without such preemption, "a state court proceeding would raise the
same inter-branch-meddling concerns that animated Buckman."102 Punitive
damages may still be obtained, however, if the FDA itself determines that it
had been defrauded by the pharmaceutical manufacturer. 103
Unlike fraud-on-the-FDA claims, most lower courts reject the conflict
preemption defense in state-law failure-to-warn claims against
pharmaceutical manufacturers.10 4 Although the FDA has filed briefs urging
for preemption in such cases, 10 5 and at least three lower courts have obliged
98. Id. at 350 (citation omitted). In addition, the Court found that because the
relationship between the FDA and the manufacturer is "inherently federal in character" and
the manufacturer's statements were dictated by a federal statute, the usual presumption
against preemption was absent from this case. Id. at 347-48. The Court in Buckman
distinguished Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), which similarly involved a
medical device manufacturer, by stating that in Medtronic, the FDCA, as amended by the
Medical Device Amendments, did not preempt the plaintiffs state-law manufacturing,
design, and warnings claims because the claims arose from the manufacturer's failure to use
reasonable care, and not from a violation of the FDCA. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 352.
99. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350.
100. Id. at 349 (citations omitted).
101. See Garcia, 385 F.3d at 967; Henderson v. Merck & Co., No. 04-CV-05987, 2005
WL 2600220 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2005); Kobar, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75; Flynn v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
102. Garcia, 385 F.3d at 966.
103. Kobar, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1175-76; see Garcia, 385 F.3d at 966 (citing Buckman,
531 U.S. at 351) (stating that under the Michigan statute, a manufacturer is not immunized
from products liability if the FDA determines that it was defrauded).
104. See, e.g., Zikis v. Pfizer, No. 04 C 8104, 2005 WL 3019409, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8,
2005) (holding that federal law did not preempt state-law failure-to-warn claims); Witczak v.
Pfizer, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D. Minn. 2005) (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences,
LLP, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005)) (failing to find preemption, stating, "If Congress had
intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would
have expressed that intent more clearly."); Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876,
887 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that federal law did not preempt state-law failure-to-warn
claims); Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 876 A.2d 115, 135 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005)
(holding that the FDCA did not preempt a state-law claim for breach of express warranty);
Smith v. Johnson & Johnson Co., No. 108901/01, 2004 WL 2964419, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 22, 2004) ("[Tlhe federal FDA prescription drug licensing scheme was not intended,
expressly or impliedly, to preempt tort claims in state courts." (citation omitted)).
105. See Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee
and Cross-Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-
55498), available at 2002 WL 32303084, at *1-*2 ("The FDA ... has a clear interest to
ensure that state tort law does not undermine the agency's authority to protect the public
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(two of which filed unreported decisions), 10 6 most lower courts reject the
preemption defense because FDA regulations allow pharmaceutical
manufacturers "[t]o add or strengthen a contraindication, warning,
precaution, or adverse reaction," without prior FDA approval. 10 7
Moreover, pharmaceutical manufacturers are required to provide a warning
"as soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious
hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved."' 10 8
Because manufacturers are permitted, and sometimes even required, to
make labeling changes without prior FDA approval, absent an express
preemption clause for pharmaceuticals in the FDCA, courts are reluctant to
find preemption of stricter state-law requirements. 109
b. HEALTHAct of 2005
At the same time as the states were enacting tort reform statutes,
Congress began considering similar reforms in order to establish a uniform
health through enforcement of the FDCA's prohibition against false or misleading labeling
of drug products" and "federal law must prevail"). On the other hand, courts often find that
state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in medical device cases because of an express
preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendment to the FDCA. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k
(2000); see, e.g., Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004); Brooks v.
Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2001). It is unclear how courts will consider the
January 2006 FDA preemption language in the preamble of the new drug-labeling rule. See
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314, 601).
106. See Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004 WL 1773697, at
*6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) (finding that the plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims were
preempted by the FDCA and its implementing regulations); Dusek v. Pfizer Inc., No. Civ. A.
H-02-3559, 2004 WL 2191804, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004) (same); Ehlis v. Shire
Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1198 (D.N.D. 2002), aff'd on other grounds, 367
F.3d 1013 (8th Cir. 2004) (same).
107. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) (2005); see Cartwright, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 886
(finding that Texas products liability "law compliments and is parallel to the FDA's
regulations regarding safety warnings and, thus, does not interfere with the objectives of the
FDA").
108. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(e) (2005). However, only "[k]nown hazards and not theoretical
possibilities shall be listed" on the label. Id. § 201.57(d).
109. Although the FDCA permits manufacturers to add warnings without prior FDA
approval, such warnings must not be false or misleading. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c), (d) (2000).
In addition, courts are hesitant to find conflict preemption between FDA regulations and
state failure-to-warn law because courts often state that FDA warning requirements establish
minimum standards that manufacturers must follow. See, e.g., Cartwright, 369 F. Supp. 2d at
882. While an express preemption is not necessary when conflict preemption exists, because
Congress chose to include a preemption clause for medical devices in the FDCA but not for
pharmaceuticals, courts generally find that "the absence of any such clause ... demonstrates
an implied intent not to preempt [pharmaceutical] cases." Id. at 885. Further, when
determining if implied conflict preemption exists, courts look to the language of the federal
regulation with a strong presumption against preemption. Id. at 883 (citing Geier v. Am.
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med.
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985)). For a further discussion of preemption in
pharmaceutical products liability litigation, see Noah, supra note 82, at 2157-61; Rabin,
supra note 2, at 2053-60.
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law that would "reduce transaction costs, provide greater certainty as to the
rights and responsibilities of all parties involved in product liability
disputes, encourage innovation, increase the competitiveness of U.S. firms,
reduce burdens on interstate commerce, and safeguard due process
rights."' 10 Most recently, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
HEALTH Act of 2005, which contains a safe harbor from punitive damages
for manufacturers who comply with FDA regulations."11 This provision
110. S. Rep. No. 105-32, at 1-2 (1997).
111. Section 7 of the HEALTH Act, in relevant part provides as follows:
(c) No Punitive Damages for Products That Comply With FDA Standards-
(1) IN GENERAL-
(A) No punitive damages may be awarded against the manufacturer or
distributor of a medical product, or a supplier of any component or raw
material of such medical product, based on a claim that such product caused
the claimant's harm where-
(i)(I) such medical product was subject to premarket approval, clearance,
or licensure by the Food and Drug Administration with respect to the safety
of the formulation or performance of the aspect of such medical product
which caused the claimant's harm or the adequacy of the packaging or
labeling of such medical product; and (II) such medical product was so
approved, cleared, or licensed; or
(ii) such medical product is generally recognized among qualified
experts as safe and effective pursuant to conditions established by the Food
and Drug Administration and applicable Food and Drug Administration
regulations, including without limitation those related to packaging and
labeling, unless the Food and Drug Administration has determined that such
medical product was not manufactured or distributed in substantial
compliance with applicable Food and Drug Administration statutes and
regulations.
(B) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Subparagraph (A) may not be
construed as establishing the obligation of the Food and Drug Administration
to demonstrate affirmatively that a manufacturer, distributor, or supplier
referred to in such subparagraph meets any of the conditions described in
such subparagraph...
(3) PACKAGING.-In a health care lawsuit for harm which is alleged to
relate to the adequacy of the packaging or labeling of a drug which is required to
have tamper-resistant packaging under regulations of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (including labeling regulations related to such packaging), the
manufacturer or product seller of the drug shall not be held liable for punitive
damages unless such packaging or labeling is found by the trier of fact by clear
and convincing evidence to be substantially out of compliance with such
regulations.
(4) EXCEPTION.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply in any health care lawsuit in
which-
(A) a person, before or after premarket approval, clearance, or licensure
of such medical product, knowingly misrepresented to or withheld from the
Food and Drug Administration information that is required to be submitted
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) or
section 351 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 262) that is material
and is causally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly suffered; or
(B) a person made an illegal payment to an official of the Food and Drug
Administration for the purpose of either securing or maintaining approval,
clearance, or licensure of such medical product.
HEALTH Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. § 7(c) (2005).
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was included "[t]o help encourage new drug development and contain the
costs of life-saving drugs.""12 Citing the rigorous nature of the FDA
approval process along with the continuing post-marketing requirements,
supporters of the bill stated that absent fraud, the FDA's determination that
the medical product will aid the public health should be respected. 113
While compensatory damages are permitted, 114 punitive damages are
reserved for cases where the manufacturer "knowingly misrepresented to or
withheld from the [FDA] information that is required to be submitted under
the [FDCA] ... that is material and is causally related to the harm which
the claimant allegedly suffered. . . or.. . made an illegal payment to an
official of [the FDA]." 115 Moreover, if punitive damages are awarded, they
are limited to the greater of $250,000 or two times the economic damages
awarded. 116 The HEALTH Act does not preempt state laws that specify the
amount of damages permitted in a health care lawsuit.117
Having briefly described the history of pharmaceutical products liability
and its relationship to the tort reform movement, as well as the current dual
track regulatory system of pharmaceuticals-the FDA and tort law-this
Note now turns to the controversy surrounding the FDA regulatory
compliance defense to punitive damages.
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE FDA-COMPLIANCE DEFENSE AS A
SHIELD TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS
LIABILITY
Although a number of states have enacted legislation barring punitive
damages in lawsuits against drug manufacturers who have complied with
FDA regulations, repeated efforts to enact similar federal legislation have
passed in the House of Representatives, but have consistently failed to pass
in the Senate. 118 The HEALTH Act of 2005 is the most recent attempt.
This part examines arguments surrounding the FDA-compliance defense in
turn.
112. H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 53-54 (2003).
113. See id.
114. The HEALTH Act permits unlimited economic damages but limits noneconomic
damages to $250,000. H.R. 5, § 4(a), (b). In addition, under the HEALTH Act, evidence of
collateral source benefits may be introduced. Id. § 6.
115. Id. § 7(c)(4). This provision is questionable, however, because it is likely preempted
by federal law. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
116. H.R. 5, § 7(b)(2).
117. Id. § 11(c).
118. See, e.g., HEALTH Act of 2004, H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004); HEALTH Act of
2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003). Many commentators called the $253 million verdict in
the Texas Vioxx trial a "death knell" for pharmaceutical research. See, e.g., Nelson Marans,
Letter to the Editor, The Verdict on Vioxx, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 2005, at A22 ("The obvious
result will be a drying up both of the new drug pipeline and, to the chagrin of some in the
legal profession, the lucrative fees resulting from lawsuits against these same drug
corporations."); Opinion, Vioxx Verdict-Il, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 2005, at A14 ("[W]hen
lawsuits of this sort proliferate beyond a certain level, they become an arm of health policy
that affects us all by reducing our future access to life-saving and life-improving drugs.").
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A. Argumentsjor the FDA-Compliance Defense to Punitive Damages
1. Chilling Effect on Product Development and Availability
Proponents of the FDA-compliance defense to punitive damages for
pharmaceutical manufacturers who comply with FDA regulations argue that
the availability and unpredictability of punitive damages in medical
products liability litigation discourages research and development of new
drugs, drives existing therapies off the market, and increases the cost of
drugs. 119 They contend that the current dual track system, consisting of
FDA regulation and tort litigation with punitive damage claims, over-deters
both the FDA and manufacturers of beneficial products. 120 Citing the
overwhelming liability associated with Bendectin, vaccines, and
contraception that led manufacturers to withdraw important drugs or leave
the market altogether, FDA-defense proponents contend that such liability
has an overall harmful effect on public health. 121
119. See Kobar v. Novartis Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1175 (D. Ariz. 2005). The court
in Kobar upheld an Arizona statute that immunizes drug manufacturers from punitive
damage liability unless the FDA finds that the manufacturer committed fraud during the
approval process. Id. at 1175. The court severed the subsection of the statute that would
require a plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer defrauded the FDA, finding this
requirement preempted by federal law. Id. at 1177.
120. See Marthaler, supra note 6, at 481. While punitive damages are meant to have a
deterrent effect on wrongful conduct, in medical products liability litigation they often cause
manufacturers to be overly cautious, either not developing new products or withholding new
products from the market. Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 699. For an in-depth
discussion of the over-deterrent effect of FDA regulation and tort law, see Michael D. Green,
Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. Mich. J.L.
Reform 461 (1997). Moreover, commentators claim that the FDA is becoming stricter-
taking more time to review drugs, more closely scrutinizing side effects, and denying
approval of drugs that would likely have been approved prior to the withdrawal of Vioxx.
See Alex Berenson, Big Drug Makers See Sales Erode With Their Image: F.D.A. Grows
More Strict, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2005, at Al (discussing the FDA's decision to deny
approval of Pargluva, Bristol-Myers-Squibb's new diabetes drug, until additional clinical
trials are conducted, and the recent research budget cuts among the largest American drug
manufacturers). Peter Huber, a fellow of the Manhattan Institute, contends that the FDA's
overly cautious regulation of thalidomide is an example of "a political layer of review of
scientific research [that] has a corrosive effect on ... science itself." Peter Huber, FDA
Caution Can be Deadly, Too, Wall St. J., July 24, 1998, at Al.
121. See Stewart, supra note 73, at 2171-77. The court in Grundberg v. Upjohn Co.
explained that the costs associated with tort liability could result in the discontinuation of a
prescription drug, which would lead to even more costly hospital procedures. 813 P.2d 89,
97 (Utah 1991) (citation and emphasis omitted). Citing a Utah statute that immunizes
manufacturers of FDA-approved drugs from punitive damages, the Grundberg court
"note[d] that the Utah Legislature has recognized the value of the FDA approval process and
the public interest in the availability and affordability of prescription drugs by restricting the
extent of liability for injuries resulting from the use of those drugs." Id. at 97. The court
agreed with the Legislature's reasoning and held that under comment k, manufacturers of
FDA-approved prescription drugs are immune from strict liability claims based on design
defects. Id. at 90.
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a. Bendectin's Withdrawal Leaves a Therapeutic Gap
In 1980, at least one in ten pregnant women in America was taking
Bendectin to treat the nausea and vomiting that often accompany
pregnancy, commonly referred to as morning sickness. 122  By 1983,
however, Bendectin, the only drug approved for this condition, was driven
off the market by hundreds of scientifically unsupported lawsuits costing
manufacturer Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals more than $100 million to
defend. 123 In Bendectin litigation, plaintiffs alleged that the morning
sickness drug caused birth defects, an association that the FDA, doctors,
and scientists failed to establish. 124 Facing the possibility of defending and
potentially losing hundreds of lawsuits which routinely included
compensatory and punitive damages claims, despite the absence of
scientific evidence of Bendectin's human teratogenicity, Merrell Dow made
a business decision to withdraw Bendectin from the American market. 125
Because Bendectin was the only medication approved to treat this
condition, pregnant women with morning sickness were left with no FDA-
approved therapeutic alternative. 126 Today, though a generic form is
available in Canada, and despite its continued FDA approval, Bendectin is
unavailable to pregnant American women. 127 A recent study comparing
morning sickness in American and Canadian women showed that American
women are hospitalized more often, experience greater weight loss, and are
absent more from work.' 2 8 Proponents of the FDA defense are quick to
122. Jane E. Brody, Shadow of Doubt Wipes Out Bendectin, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1983,
at E7. Between 1956 and 1983, more than thirty-three million pregnant women took
Bendectin to relieve morning sickness. See id. More than 300 lawsuits alleging birth defects
in babies born to mothers who used Bendectin during their pregnancy were filed in the five
years prior to the drug's withdrawal from the market in 1983. See id.
123. See Marthaler, supra note 6, at 471; see also Brody, supra note 122.
124. See Gregory C. Jackson, Pharmaceutical Product Liability May Be Hazardous to
Your Health: A No-Fault Alternative to Concurrent Regulation, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 199, 207
(1992) ("The FDA and most courts were unequivocal in finding no increased risk of birth
defects associated with Bendectin.").
125. Brody, supra note 122. The director of professional communications for Merrell
Dow stated, "'We were forced for business reasons to take a safe and effective medication
off the market."' Id. With an income of $13 million from sales of Bendectin, Merrell Dow's
insurance premium increased to $10 million. Id. Prior to its withdrawal, the cost of
Bendectin rose over three hundred percent. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479
(Cal. 1988). Even though punitive damages were routinely awarded in Bendectin litigation,
they were routinely reversed on appeal. See Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 702, 703 &
n.60; see, e.g., Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(overturning a jury's award of $20 million in compensatory damages and $75 million in
punitive damages because of the lack of a statistically significant association between
Bendectin and the plaintiff's type of limb defect).
126. See Paolo Mazzotta et al., Attitudes, Management and Consequences of Nausea and
Vomiting of Pregnancy in the United States and Canada, 70 Int'l J. Gynecology &
Obstetrics 359, 360 (2000).
127. Id. Neither Bendectin nor its generic form, Diclectin (a doxylamine/pyridoxine
combination), is available in the United States. Id.
128. Id. at 363-64. The dehydration associated with nausea and vomiting of pregnancy
can detrimentally affect the pregnant woman and fetus. Thus, medical experts are calling for
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point out that the number of birth defects remains unchanged since
Bendectin's withdrawal. 129 The therapeutic gap created by Bendectin's
withdrawal from the market is often used by proponents of the FDA-
compliance defense as a striking example of the effect that tort liability has
on safe and effective drugs. 130
b. Lack of Contraceptive Research
Proponents of the FDA defense argue that despite the tremendous
number of reproductive age women, the fear of excessive tort liability has
significantly contributed to the lack of contraceptive research and
development. 13 1  In support of this theory, one FDA-defense advocate
points to Wooderson v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,132 where a plaintiff
was awarded $2.75 million in punitive damages after developing hemolytic
uremic syndrome ("HUS") allegedly caused by oral contraceptive use. 133
There, the manufacturer was held liable for failing to warn of the risk of
contraceptive-induced HUS even though the FDA expressly failed to
concur with the manufacturer's proposed drug labeling that included such
warning. 134  With punitive liability imposed for conduct specifically
addressed by the FDA and consistent with its determination, proponents
contend that the lack of contraceptive research is not surprising. 135
Although new patents have been issued for contraceptive products, these
are only incremental advances on existing therapies; the need for
innovative, effective, safe, and user-friendly options is not being met.136
FDA-defense proponents argue that a compliance-based shield from
the reintroduction of Bendectin, which is still FDA approved to treat morning sickness. See
Robert Brent, Medical, Social, and Legal Implications of Treating Nausea and Vomiting of
Pregnancy, 186 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology S262, S265 (2002). In addition, these
experts are recommending that instead of blaming the Bendectin litigation crisis on trial
lawyers, the medical community should focus its attention on the "junk scientists" who
participate in nonmeritorious litigation. See id. at S263.
129. See Stewart, supra note 73, at 2171. Hospital admissions for pregnancy-associated
nausea and vomiting have doubled since Merrell Dow withdrew Bendectin from the
American market; the rate of birth defects remained unchanged. See James T. Rosenbaum,
Lessons from Litigation over Silicone Breast Implants: A Call for Activism by Scientists,
276 Science 1524, 1524 (1997).
130. See Green, supra note 20, at 164-65 ("Peter Huber, who popularized the term 'junk
science,' has repeatedly returned to the Bendectin litigation to demonstrate the ills of the tort
system." (citing Michael D. Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass
Toxic Substances Litigation 21 (1996))). The FDA recently restated that Bendectin does not
increase the risk of birth defects. Brent, supra note 128, at S266.
131. See Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 701-02; see also Jerome F. Strauss III &
Michael Kafrissen, Waiting for the Second Coming: Contraceptive Research Is Seriously in
Need of Revitalization, 432 Nature 43 (2004) (arguing that tort liability hampers
contraceptive research, depriving the 1.5 billion women of reproductive age of innovative
products).
132. 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984).
133. Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 702.
134. Wooderson, 681 P.2d at 1057.
135. See Strauss & Kafrissen, supra note 131.
136. See Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 702; Strauss & Kafrissen, supra note 131.
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punitive damages would encourage much needed contraceptive
development.1 37
c. Vaccine Liability
Similarly, advocates of the FDA defense argue that tort liability has
driven manufacturers out of the vaccine business. 138 In the 1980s, facing
hundreds of suits involving punitive damages, vaccine manufacturers exited
the industry because the business no longer made economic sense. 139
Despite Congress's efforts to ameliorate this situation,140 there are still
relatively few manufacturers producing vaccines; 141 this has resulted in
recent shortages of five routinely recommended childhood vaccines, 142 and
the well-publicized annual shortages of the influenza vaccine. 143 Moreover,
commentators are concerned that the fear of unlimited tort liability is
impeding the development of an AIDS vaccine, 144 and more recently, a
vaccine for the bird flu. 145
2. Complex Issues Regarding Inherently Hazardous Products
Because of the inherently hazardous nature of pharmaceutical drugs and
the complex issues presented in medical products liability litigation,
commentators argue that manufacturers who comply with FDA regulations
should not be subject to punitive damages. 146 The FDA, courts, and
137. See Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 702.
138. See id at 699-701.
139, See id. at 700 (citations omitted).
140. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
141. There are currently only four manufacturers making vaccines, down from over
twenty manufacturers in the 1970s and early 1980s. See Paul A. Offit, Opinion, Lawsuits
Won't Stop Pandemics, Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at A16. Dr. Offit, the Chief of Infectious
Diseases at the Children's Hospital of Philadelphia, describes the importance of vaccines and
the unintended tragedies that they have caused. See id. He also explains that because of the
inevitability of injuries, litigation does not make vaccines safer-it just increases their costs
and decreases their availability. See id
142. See Protecting Our Kids: What Is Causing the Current Shortage in Childhood
Vaccines: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Gov 't Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of
Walter A. Orenstein, Director, National Immunization Program, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nip/news/testimonies/vac-shortages-walt-6-12-2002.htm; David Brown,
Pediatric Vaccine Stockpile at Risk, Wash. Post, April 17, 2005, at Al (reporting that the
government's stockpile of childhood vaccines is dangerously low).
143. See Alan Murray, Roche Feels the Highs and Lows of Feverish Demand for Tamiflu,
Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A2 (discussing the current threat of a global bird flu pandemic).
In response to the current threat of bird flu, President George W. Bush released a "National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza." See Offit, supra note 141. To encourage the domestic
development of a bird flu vaccine, the strategy contains liability protection from litigation.
Id.
144. See Green, supra note 20, at 165 (citing Jon Cohen, Is Liability Slowing AIDS
Vaccines?, 256 Science 168 (1992)).
145. See Offit, supra note 141.
146. See Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 697 & nn. 19-20, 698.
2006] 2447
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
commentators often point out that all pharmaceutical drugs pose some level
of risk; drugs are physiologically active agents that have both significant
health benefits and unintended side effects. 147 Drug litigation typically
involves the failure to warn about these adverse side effects, information
about which may be present in the drug manufacturer's internal
documents. 148  FDA-defense supporters argue that jurors view this
information as the requisite evidence of recklessness or malice to support a
punitive damages claim against the manufacturer. 149
Moreover, FDA-defense supporters argue that pharmaceutical litigation
involves complex scientific questions that are too difficult for
"unsophisticated" jurors to understand. 150 Because of the complicated
nature of the issues surrounding the injury or death of a sympathetic
plaintiff, FDA-defense supporters contend that jurors are particularly
influenced by a plaintiff's experts. 151 For instance, despite admittedly not
understanding the medical evidence presented, the jury in the first Vioxx
case to go to trial, Ernst v. Merck, awarded the widow of a man who died of
a heart arrhythmia, a condition Vioxx has not ever been found to cause,
over $253 million, including $229 million in punitive damages.' 52
3. The FDA Rigorously Regulates Pharmaceuticals
Supporters of the FDA defense argue that allowing punitive damages in
cases where pharmaceutical manufacturers comply with FDA regulations
ignores the stringency of the FDA regulatory process.153 They contend that
the FDA is the most qualified agency to make the necessary scientific and
public policy decisions surrounding the marketing of a particular drug.
Besides the rigorous drug approval process, the FDA continues to regulate
147. Green, supra note 20, at 168; see Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah
1991) ("[P]rescription drugs ... will almost always pose some risk .... Despite these risks,
new drugs are continually approved by the FDA because of their social benefit in saving
lives and alleviating human suffering."); Kweder Testimony, supra note 66.
148. Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 698.
149. Id.
150. Noah, supra note 82, at 2150-51. Arguing for a complete regulatory compliance
defense, Professor Lars Noah contends that jurors in medical products liability cases across
the country make their own determinations about "appropriate prescription drug labeling,
effectively second-guessing the FDA's far more expert, accountable, and uniform
determination." Id. Supporters of the FDA defense to punitive damages state that the
medical questions in medical products liability cases are too complex for lay jurors. See
Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 698.
151. Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 698.
152. See Paul Davies & Heather Won Tesoriero, For Merck, Vioxx Venue Offers Shield,
Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 2005, at B3; Editorial, The Vioxx Hex, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 2005, at
A30. An Ernst v. Merck juror who thought that the medical evidence presented was
confusing, stated that "' [w]e didn't know what the heck they were talking about."' Editorial,
The Vioxx Hex, supra.
153. H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 56 (2003) ("The [FDA] requirements for [a new
drug] are so extensive.., that... punitive damages will not provide additional societal
benefits beyond those achieved by the FDCA's rules and regulations.").
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the product throughout the drug's life.154 These regulations, supporters and
the FDA itself claim, are optimal standards, establishing both a "floor" and
a "ceiling," not minimum standards open to reevaluation by unaccountable
jurors. 155
Because pharmaceuticals are vital, nationally marketed products, the
FDA with its scientific expertise, rather than the tort system, is far better
suited to make accurate and uniform risk-benefit determinations in the
overall interest of society. 156 FDA-defense advocates contend that lay
judges and jurors, on the other hand, evaluate the drug on a case-by-case
basis, only after an alleged injury has occurred, and ignore the socially
beneficial nature of the product.157
4. Multiple Claims Subject to Differing Legal Standards Increases
Settlement and Litigation Costs
Absent an FDA-compliance defense to punitive damages, proponents
argue that pharmaceutical manufacturers are subject to multiple claims with
differing legal standards. 158  This inconsistency and uncertainty, they
contend, increases settlement and litigation costs. 159  Because drug
154. Id. at 54.
155. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314, 601) (stating that additional state-law requirements can expose a manufacturer
to liability if additional risk disclosures are unsubstantiated or false and misleading, and
undermine patient safety by overwarning about speculative risks, resulting in the
underutilization of beneficial treatments); Noah, supra note 82, at 2151-52, 2158. Professor
Noah contends that the FDA product safety standards meet the Restatement (Third), section
4, comment e, exception to the black-letter rule that regulatory compliance does not preclude
liability. Id. Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski argue that FDA standards are
not minimum standards and that compliance with FDA warning requirements "should
practically foreclose liability." James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265,
321 (1990). They state that courts "should refuse to second-guess the judgments of agencies
who possess not only expertise but also a capacity for knowledge and memory which the
courts cannot match." Id.
156. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 56; Green, supra note 120, at 477 (discussing the
inaccurate decisions of multiple Bendectin juries "despite a strong consensus in the medical,
scientific, and FDA communities that Bendectin is not a teratogen.").
157. See Stewart, supra note 73, at 2174-75. Arguing for preemption of claims when
manufacturers comply with FDA regulations, Professor David G. Owen states, "If the FDA
fully and fairly evaluates all of the [clinical data, proposed warnings, and usage information],
and approves for sale the drug and warnings, then it would seem to make little sense to let a
jury reevaluate the same information and find the drug or warnings 'defective'." Owen,
supra note 75, at 20 (citation omitted).
158. See Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 698; see also Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967) ("The legal difficulties engendered by claims
for punitive damages on the part of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering .... We have the
gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of
actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill.").
159. Kuhlik & Kingham, supra note 3, at 697; see Nathan Koppel, Trial-less Lawyers,
Wall St. J., Dec. 1, 2005, at B1 ("Scared off by huge jury verdicts, such as the $253 million
awarded this year to the widow of a man who died after taking Merck & Co.'s Vioxx drug,
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manufacturers potentially face thousands of catastrophic punitive damage
claims for a single course of conduct, sometimes after losing just a couple
of cases, they choose to settle the remaining cases rather than take that
risk. 160 Marcia Angell, the former editor-in-chief of The New England
Journal of Medicine, stated that despite evidence showing that breast
implants did not cause the injuries alleged in the "flood of lawsuits,"
manufacturers, in effect, were forced to settle---"[a]ll it took was a couple
of high stakes wins for [the manufacturers] to be brought to their knees
essentially." 16 ' The House of Representatives stated that "[t]his effect
alone warrants preclusion of punitive damages where there has been
regulatory compliance." 162
more civil litigants are arbitrating or settling the majority of disputes .... ). Between 1976
and 2003, state civil jury trials declined 34%, while during the same period, the volume of
civil cases disposed rose 165%. Id.
160. See Hazardous to Our Health: Trial Lawyers, Inc. Hurts Consumer Health With Its
Full-Fledged Assault on the US. Medical System, Trial Lawyers Inc. Heath Care, The
Lawsuit Industry's Effect on American Health, 2005,
http://www.triallawyersinc.com/healthcare/hc02.htrnl (stating that a couple of multimillion-
dollar verdicts can cause "cowed defendants [to] settle the thousands of weaker claims-
often for billions of dollars."). For instance, in the fen-phen lawsuits, Wyeth-Ayerst
Laboratories, Inc. (formerly American Home Products Corp.) began to settle after losing two
lawsuits totaling over $120 million. At this time, Wyeth has paid out over $14 billion of its
estimated $21 billion fen-phen associated liability. Id. Despite its repeated statements that it
would defend every Vioxx lawsuit, after losing the first Vioxx case, Ernst v. Merck, which
was almost universally considered a weak case on the issue of causation, Merck's general
counsel said that it would consider making individual settlements in cases where heart attack
victims took Vioxx for a long period of time and lacked other risk factors. See Alex
Berenson, Maker of Vioxx Says Some Suits May be Settled, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2005, at
Al. After winning the second Vioxx case, Humeston v. Merck, the Wall Street Journal
reported that Merck was analyzing the litigation strategies of other mass pharmaceutical
suits, including Wyeth's fen-phen cases and Johnson & Johnson's Propulsid cases, to
determine the best approach to defending and settling the Vioxx lawsuits. See Barbara
Martinez, Merck Faces Crossroads in Vioxx Cases, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 2005, at B1. The
third Vioxx lawsuit to reach trial, in which a man died after taking Vioxx for less than a
month, ended in a mistrial. See Alex Berenson, A Mistrial Is Declared in 3rd Suit Over
Vioxx, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 2005, at Cl.
161. Online Newshour: Science and the Law (PBS television broadcast Oct. 1, 1996)
(Interview by David Gergen with Marcia Angell, Editor-in-Chief, The New Eng. Journal of
Med.), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/gergen/october96/implant_10-1.html.
[hereinafter Interview by David Gergen].
162. H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 55 n.191 (2003). Dr. Angell, who is admittedly a
"liberal Democrat ... only too ready to see the companies at fault," Interview by David
Gergen, supra note 161, offers a harsh review of the tort system in the breast implant
litigation in her 1996 book. See Marcia Angell, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical
Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case (1996).
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5. Punitive Damages Are Unnecessary to Compensate Plaintiffs
Because plaintiffs would still be entitled to compensatory damages, 163
FDA-compliance defense supporters argue that punitive damages are not
necessary to compensate injured parties. 164 If an injury occurs despite a
pharmaceutical manufacturer's good faith efforts to comply with FDA
regulations, the injured party, such as the party in Wooderson v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp.,165 would be entitled to recover economic and
noneconomic damages. 166 Since punitive damages are meant to punish and
deter wrongful conduct, FDA-defense advocates argue that punitive
damages are unwarranted if the manufacturer diligently complied with the
regulations promulgated by the agency charged with protecting public
health. 167 Furthermore, as Judge Friendly observed in 1967, "[m]any
awards of compensatory damages doubtless contain something of a punitive
element, and more would do so if a separate award for exemplary damages
were eliminated."' 168
B. Arguments Against the FDA-Compliance Defense to Punitive Damages
1. The FDA Fails to Protect the Public Health and Safety
Opponents of the FDA-compliance defense to punitive damages for
pharmaceutical manufacturers who comply with FDA regulations argue that
the FDA fails to protect consumers from unacceptable risks associated with
163. See HEALTH Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005). The HEALTH Act of
2005 permits unlimited recovery for actual economic losses and up to $250,000 for
noneconomic damages, defined as "damages for physical and emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of
life, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium,... hedonic damages, injury to
reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature." Id. §§ 4, 9. Moreover,
up to $250,000 in punitive damages or twice the economic damages, whichever is greater,
may be awarded if the manufacturer knowingly misrepresented or withheld material
information from the FDA that is causally related to the plaintiff's alleged harm, or made
illegal payments to the FDA. Id. § 7(b)(2), (c)(4); see also supra Part I.B.2.a.ii-b.
164. See Marthaler, supra note 6, at 485; see also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1967) ("A manufacturer distributing a drug to many thousands
of users under government regulation scarcely requires this additional measure [of punitive
damages] for manifesting social disapproval and assuring deterrence. Criminal penalties and
heavy compensatory damages... even without proof of negligence, should sufficiently meet
these objectives ...."). Instead of tort liability with punitive damages, Professor Richard B.
Stewart recommends an administrative no-fault compensation system to cover injuries
sustained from FDA-approved products. See Stewart, supra note 73, at 2182.
165. 681 P.2d 1038 (Kan. 1984).
166. Marthaler, supra note 6, at 485; see HEALTH Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. § 4.
167. See Marthaler, supra note 6, at 485.
168. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 841. More recently, Professor Catherine M. Sharkey noted
that caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases will have an unintended
"crossover effect," thereby dampening the intended effect of the caps. See Catherine M.
Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 391, 391 (2005).
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medical products.169 Critics often state that FDA regulations are "outdated,
under-protective, or under-enforced.' 170 Concerned that injuries still occur
despite FDA approval, critics contend that punitive damages are an
important tool for motivating manufacturers to produce the safest drug
possible. 171
Moreover, commentators claim that because much of the FDA approval
process relies on self-reporting by the manufacturer, unconstrained tort
liability plays an important role in educating consumers about serious
health risks associated with medical products. 172 In addition, commentators
claim that the agency is heavily influenced by politics and the companies
that they are regulating.173 Furthermore, they state that there is a conflict of
interest-the agency responsible for approving a medical product is the
same agency responsible for seeking and receiving post-marketing safety
information, and ultimately for withdrawing the product from the market. 174
The withdrawal of Vioxx 175 and the Guidant heart device, defects are cited
as examples of the FDA's recent failures. 176
169. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 260 (2003); Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., A Gift for
Drug Makers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 2005, at A23 ("We know the F.D.A. has failed time and
again to ensure that unsafe drugs are kept off the market. To provide blanket legal
protection against punitive damages in such cases [where the drug or medical device had
received FDA approval] is both unwarranted and dangerous."); see also Grundberg v.
Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 102 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that "the majority
simply ignores FDA failures to protect the public against unnecessary and unacceptable
risks").
170. H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 260. FDA-defense critics mention the Dalkon Shield
and silicone breast implants as dangerous marketed products that caused injuries. Id. at 261.
While the Dalkon Shield did cause injuries, it did not have FDA approval at the time it was
sold because the FDCA did not require devices to have premarket approval. Id. at 56. The
FDCA was amended in 1976 to require premarket approval of medical devices. Id. In
addition, despite a multi-billion dollar settlement fund for alleged injuries caused by silicone
breast implants, no association has been found between the implants and the injuries alleged
(autoimmune and connective tissue diseases). See Rabin, supra note 2, at 2061-62.
171. See Marthaler, supra note 6, at 472.
172. See William G. Childs, The Implementation of FDA Determinations in Litigation:
Why Do We Defer to the PTO but Not to the FDA?, 5 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 155, 168-69
(2004); Rabin, supra note 2, at 2060-6 1.
173. Placitella & Klein, supra note 8, at 220; see Noah, supra note 82, at 2154
(discussing unsubstantiated claims of agency "capture" by opponents of the FDA-
compliance defense). For an in-depth discussion of one commentator's opinion on the
pharmaceutical industry's influence on the FDA, see Angell, supra note 50, at 193-216.
174. See Placitella & Klein, supra note 8, at 220-21. For recent criticism of the post-
marketing surveillance system, see Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System:
Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 Yale J. Health
Pol'y L. & Ethics 587, 594-606 (2005) (examining several options for improving the current
pharmaceutical litigation system).
175. See Placitella & Klein, supra note 8, at 221.
176. See Barry Meier, F.D.A. Had Report of Short Circuit in Heart Devices:
Confidentiality at Issue, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2005, at Al. Guidant Corporation submitted
annual reports to the FDA that included data about the malfunctioning of some of its heart
defibrillators. Id. The FDA did not make the information public at the time because it treats
the information in annual reports as confidential. ld. After the New York Times article was
published, physicians, regulators, and industry officials gathered to discuss better ways to
disclose safety information to physicians and patients. Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Devices
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FDA-defense opponents claim that because the FDA fails to protect the
public, tort law provides a "vital safety net" to ensure that manufacturers
comply both with the "letter of the law" and "the unwritten laws of human
morality and decency."' 177
2. FDA Regulations Establish Only Minimum Safety Standards
Opponents of the FDA defense contend that the FDA regulations only set
a minimum standard of safety, ensuring "only a minimum level of
protection for the public."'178 Critics argue that because FDA safety
regulations establish merely a floor, state law and the tort system are
necessary to ensure that products are designed as safely as possible and are
accompanied by appropriate warnings. 179 For instance, in Edwards v. Basel
Pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that compliance
with FDA regulations did not satisfy a nicotine patch manufacturer's
common-law duty to warn consumers.180 There, the court held that
compliance with the FDA's warning requirements is not conclusive; state
products liability law must be applied to assess the adequacy of the
warnings. 181
3. The FDA-Compliance Defense to Punitive Damages Is Unnecessary
Opponents contend that an FDA-compliance defense to punitive damages
is not needed. 182 They point out that punitive damage awards against
pharmaceutical manufacturers who complied with FDA requirements are
May Expand Release of Malfunction Data Beyond F.D.A., N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 2005, at
C3. The FDA claims that there is a great risk of releasing safety information
"'premature[ly], that's inaccurate."' Thomas M. Burton, Change Is Sought in Safety Notices
for Defibrillators, Wall St. J., Sept. 17-18, 2005, at A5 (quoting Timothy Ulatowski,
compliance director for medical devices at the FDA). As a result of the Guidant episode, the
New York Times reports that the FDA is planning to propose new guidelines to make annual
safety data reported by medical device manufacturers more useful to the agency and more
complete and accessible to the public. See Barry Meier, Plan to Require More Data on
Safety Issues, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 2006, at C13.
177. See Placitella & Klein, supra note 8, at 234.
178. H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 260 (2003). This argument relies on the traditional
rule that regulatory compliance is not a defense to liability-that governmental safety
regulations generally establish a floor below which the product is deemed defective. See
supra Part I.B.2.a.i.
179. See Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 933 P.2d 298, 302 (Okla. 1997) (finding that the
FDA sets minimum safety standards as to drug warnings and design); Rabin, supra note 2, at
2050 (citing Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b) (1997)).
180. Edwards, 933 P.2d at 303.
181. Id.
182. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 24, at 745 ("Contrary to popular belief, juries rarely
award such damages, and award them especially rarely in products liability and medical
malpractice cases. Rather, juries tend to award punitive damages in intentional misconduct
cases." (citations omitted)); Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products
Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 23 (1992)
(discussing that punitive damages are rarely awarded in products liability).
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rare. 183 Even if juries return large punitive damages awards, critics argue,
they are often either reduced by state caps or on appeal.' 84 Moreover,
opponents contend that the FDA defense is unnecessary because drug
manufacturers are already protected by liability-restrictive devices, such as
comment k, the learned intermediary doctrine, and the Federal Vaccine Act.
4. The Lack of Innovation Is Due to Manufacturers' Choice to Profit from
"Me-Too" Drugs
Marcia Angell, an outspoken critic of the pharmaceutical industry,
blames the lack of innovative products on the manufacturers' choice to
profit at a low cost by marketing drugs that are similar to an already proven
blockbuster drug, not on the fear of liability. 185 She claims that these "me-
too" drugs are currently pharmaceutical manufacturers' major business,
contributing to the manufacturers' already high marketing costs. 186 She
states that instead of developing a cure for AIDS or cancer, or vaccines for
Americans, manufacturers "would rather turn out another baldness drug."' 187
In fact, true innovation, she contends, comes from National Institutes of
Health ("NIH") sponsored research. 188
5. Products Liability Law Is Best Reserved to the States
Opponents of an FDA-compliance defense argue that state legislatures,
rather than Congress, are better situated to determine what is necessary to
protect the health and safety of their citizens. 189 Because tort-related safety
regulation has traditionally been within states' autonomy, opponents claim
183. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 55 n.191; Eisenberg et al., supra note 24, at 745.
184. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 51.
185. Frontline: The Other Drug War (PBS television broadcast Nov. 26, 2002), available
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/other/interviews/angell.html (Interview
with Marcia Angell) [hereinafter Frontline Interview with Angell]. Dr. Angell argues that
manufacturers should be required to demonstrate to the FDA that the new drugs are
improvements over the drugs already on the market, rather then merely better than a placebo.
Id. For further discussion of this theory, see Angell, supra note 50, at 74-93.
186. Frontline Interview with Angell, supra note 185. Dr. Angell states that
manufacturers spend, on average, fifteen to seventeen percent of their profits on research and
development, and thirty-five percent on marketing and administration. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. The Wall Street Journal reports that Anthony S. Fauci, the director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease within the NIH, spends $500 to $600
million per year providing NIH grants and contracts to private companies to develop drugs
and vaccines needed to protect Americans against bioterrorism. See Bernard Wysocki, Jr.,
Agency Chief Spurs Bioterror Research-And Controversy, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 2005, at Al.
Facing criticism, Dr. Fauci defends this government "bank-rolling [of] product
development" by stating that "'[tihe industry wasn't going to make the investment when
they had a choice between developing a new Viagra, a new Lipitor, versus the very risky
procedure of doing advanced development in a product where there wasn't going to be a
guaranteed payback for them."' Id. (quoting Dr. Anthony Fauci). For a further discussion of
Dr. Angell's theory on pharmaceutical manufacturers' innovation, see Angell, supra note 50,
at 52-73.
189. See S. Rep. No. 105-32, at 64, 78-79 (1997).
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that absent clear evidence that interstate variations are impeding commerce
among the states, federal legislation should not be enacted. 190  Such
evidence, opponents claim, has not been presented. Instead, opponents
contend that juries rarely award punitive damages in products liability
cases, and that the fear of tort liability does not deter the marketing of
innovative drugs. 191
6. Disproportionate Impact on Seniors and Women
Finally, FDA-defense opponents argue that banning punitive damages in
cases where manufacturers complied with FDA regulations will have a
disproportionate impact on seniors and women.192 Citing the alleged
injuries caused by the Dalkon Shield, oral contraceptives, and
diethylstilbestrol, the opponents claim that women and seniors account for
the largest class injured by medical products. 193 Supporting this position,
Professor Michael Rustad claims that the "Fen-Phen tragedy illustrates the
potential problem of immunizing manufacturers who have complied with
FDA standards but knowingly endanger the consuming public."1 94
III. PUBLIC POLICY WEIGHS IN FAVOR OF THE FDA REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE DEFENSES AS A SHIELD TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
PHARMACEUTICAL LITIGATION
This part contends that although there are strong arguments and valid
concerns on both sides of the FDA regulatory compliance defense
debate, 195 it seems inherently unreasonable as a matter of public policy that
the co-regulation of pharmaceuticals is left to punitive damages in tort law.
Complex scientific and public health risk-benefit determinations are likely
best left to the FDA, rather than lay fact finders.196 Because the FDA-
compliance defense to punitive damages allows injured parties to be fairly
compensated and maintains the punitive damages remedy for fraudulent
conduct, 19 7 the defense satisfies two of the key social goals of tort law,
namely compensation for injury and deterrence of wrongful conduct.
Absent an FDA determination of fraud, it is unclear who we are punishing
190. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 2059 (discussing federalism considerations surrounding
preemption and the complete regulatory compliance defense to products liability claims).
191. S. Rep. No. 105-32, at 74, 88-89; see Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 102-03
(Utah 1991) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("[N]ot a shred of evidence has been presented to this
Court that indicates that liability under the tort system has deterred pharmaceutical
companies from introducing new drugs.").
192. See H.R. Rep. No. 108-32, pt. 1, at 260 (2003).
193. Id. at 260-61.
194. Rustad, supra note 25, at 1356 (discussing the "unanticipated negative impact" of
the FDA defense on women-the majority of the three hundred thousand fen-phen plaintiffs
were women).
195. See supra Part II.A-B (explaining the arguments for and against the FDA regulatory
compliance defense).
196. See supra Part II.A.2-3.
197. See HEALTH Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. §§ 4, 7(c)(4) (2005).
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and what we are attempting to deter by imposing punitive damage awards
against FDA-compliant pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Congress should resolve the long-standing debate by passing the
HEALTH Act, which includes an FDA regulatory compliance defense to
punitive damages provision. 198 Along with the enactment of the FDA
defense, however, FDA regulations should be reevaluated to ensure that the
agency provides the most effective pre- and post-marketing safety
regulation of pharmaceuticals. Finally, this part discusses possible
consequences of the FDA regulatory compliance defense. 199
A. FDA Compliance Should Preclude Punitive Damage Awards
In the majority of jurisdictions, a pharmaceutical manufacturer can spend
years and hundreds of millions of dollars researching and developing a new
drug, fully comply with the FDA's rigorous pre- and post-marketing safety
regulatory requirements, and then, when an inevitable injury occurs, be
subject to tort liability, including punitive damage claims. The availability
of punitive damages in such litigation has caused long-standing
disagreement among legal commentators 200 and the issue is routinely
considered by Congress. 201
1. The Regulation of Pharmaceuticals Is Far Too Important to Entrust to
Lay Fact Finders
Controversy surrounding the effect that tort liability has on the
pharmaceutical industry is extensive. 20 2 Concerned that the availability of
punitive damages has a chilling effect on product development and
availability, 20 3  and increases settlement and litigation costs,2 ° 4
commentators argue that compliant pharmaceutical manufacturers, who are
already extensively regulated by a specialized agency, 20 5 should be shielded
from punitive damage awards. Moreover, these commentators are
concerned about the nonscientific co-regulation of complex, inherently
hazardous products by fact finders who lack expertise.206
On the other hand, critics of the pharmaceutical industry contend that the
lack of innovative therapies is caused by manufacturers' greed for profits
198. See id. § 7(c).
199. See infra Part II.B.
200. See supra Part II.A-B (explaining the arguments for and against the FDA regulatory
compliance defense).
201. See, e.g., HEALTH Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong.; HEALTH Act of 2004, H.R.
4280, 108th Cong. (2004); HEALTH Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003).
202. See supra Part II.A-B (explaining the arguments for and against the FDA regulatory
compliance defense).
203. See supra Part II.A. 1 (discussing the effect of liability on drugs and vaccines).
204. See supra Part II.A.4 (describing the argument that liability increases settlement and
litigation costs).
205. See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining the argument that drugs are already rigorously
regulated by the FDA).
206. See supra Part II.A.2 (noting that all drugs pose some level of risk).
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evidenced by "me-too" drugs, 207 and that punitive damage awards are rare
in pharmaceutical litigation where there has been FDA compliance.208
Furthermore, these critics claim that FDA regulations establish merely
minimum safety standards, 20 9 and that punitive damages are necessary
because the FDA fails to adequately protect the public from unacceptable
risks.210
Unfortunately, because of the lack of reliable supporting evidence, this
important controversy remains unsettled.211 What is clear, however, is that
after being mired by tort litigation with punitive damages claims, safe and
beneficial drugs have been voluntarily withdrawn from the market 212 and
only few manufacturers continue to make vital vaccines. 213 In addition,
juries have been known to award punitive damages even absent a clear
causal connection between the defendant's drug and the claimant's alleged
injury.214 Finally, drug manufacturers have settled an unknown number of
weak cases rather than risk devastating punitive damage awards imposed by
lay jurors. 215
If a pharmaceutical manufacturer has fully complied with FDA
regulatory requirements and disclosed all material information that is
causally related to the claimant's alleged injury, there is no valid
justification for a punitive damage award.216 Because claimants are often
adequately compensated in pharmaceutical litigation, using punitive
damages as a regulatory device for deterrence when there has been FDA
compliance is irrational. The regulation of both a drug's design and
warnings is an inherently complex and multifaceted process that requires
experience, scientific expertise, and open access to a manufacturer's data in
order to render a responsible judgment in the interest of all users of drugs.
This ultimate judgment can only be responsibly and consistently made by a
group with the essential expertise. Allowing inexpert fact finders to
207. See supra Part II.B.4 (describing Marcia Angell's claim that the lack of
pharmaceutical innovation is due to drug manufacturers' choice to market drugs that are
similar to existing drugs).
208. See supra Part II.B.3 (noting that punitive damages are rarely awarded in
pharmaceutical litigation).
209. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the argument that FDA regulations establish only
minimum standards and that tort liability provides the necessary additional protection for
consumers).
210. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing FDA regulatory compliance defense opponent's
argument that the FDA fails to adequately protect the public).
211. See supra Part II.A-B (explaining the arguments for and against the FDA regulatory
compliance defense).
212. See supra Part II.A. L.a (discussing Bendectin's withdrawal from the market).
213. See supra Part II.A. .c (describing the argument that tort liability has driven vaccine
manufacturers from the market).
214. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (describing jury awards in Bendectin
litigation, despite the lack of association between the drug and the alleged injuries).
215. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing settlements in the breast implant and fen-phen
litigation).
216. See ALI Study, supra note 45, at 101 (explaining that the case for a regulatory
compliance defense is strongest when there is a claim for punitive damages).
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second-guess the decisions of the extensive regulatory system of the FDA
can and has decreased the availability of essential drugs, leaving potential
users with no adequate therapy.
While commentators disagree about the appropriateness and necessity of
the FDA-compliance defense to punitive damages, they do not dispute the
broader public interest in the development and availability of
pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceuticals are a vital part of modem medical
care. 217 It is the unique importance of pharmaceuticals, combined with
their comprehensive regulation by the FDA that justifies departure from the
traditional doctrine that regulatory compliance is not legally dispositive.218
2. Reevaluating FDA Regulations
While this Note argues that Congress should establish a uniform standard
that bars punitive damages in pharmaceutical litigation where
manufacturers have complied with FDA regulations, it also suggests that
the FDA's pre-and post-marketing safety regulations should be reevaluated
and reworked. Though identifying the necessary and best method to revise
FDA regulations is beyond the scope of this Note,219 it seems that the FDA
itself is aware of the need to strengthen drug safety, as evidenced by the
recent initiatives.220 Furthermore, the FDA needs to be adequately funded
in order to ensure that the agency is able to perform its critical regulatory
activities. 221
B. Consequences of the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense to Punitive
Damages
As with any new legislation, Congress's enactment of the FDA
regulatory compliance defense to punitive damages would likely have both
intended and unintended consequences.
1. Impact on the Pharmaceutical Industry
The ideal effect of the FDA regulatory compliance defense to punitive
damages would be to encourage manufacturers to develop innovative life-
enhancing and life-sustaining therapies and to maintain the availability of
217. As Harvard Medical School Professor Thomas P. Stossel recently wrote, doctors are
not very useful to patients without drugs developed by drug companies, companies who are
often erroneously vilified by the media as greedy sinners. Thomas P. Stossel, Opinion, Mere
Magazines, Wall. St. J., Dec. 30, 2005, at A16.
218. This departure is especially appropriate now that the FDA itself has explicitly
established that it does not consider FDA approved drug labeling to be a minimum standard.
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of ways to strengthen drug safety regulation, see Angell, supra note
50, at 242-47.
220. See supra notes 60, 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA's new drug
labeling rule, New Drug Safety Initiative, and MedWatch, an FDA website dedicated to
providing drug safety information).
221. Galson Testimony, supra note 49.
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vital drugs with unavoidable side effects. Research has yet to be conducted
to determine whether such legislation would have this desired effect.222
In addition, critics' concerns that because the FDA approval and post-
marketing reporting process is largely based on self-reporting,
manufacturers will have no incentive to reveal unfavorable data are likely
unfounded.223 Safety incentives will not be removed because the HEALTH
Act of 2005 and most state statutes that provide a regulatory compliance
defense do not bar punitive damages when manufacturers fail to comply
with FDA regulations. 224
2. The Crossover Effect
Pursuant to the HEALTH Act of 2005 as passed by the U.S. House of
Representatives on July 28, 2005, punitive damages awards against
pharmaceutical manufacturers are barred absent fraud.225 Aware of this
shield, plaintiffs' attorneys will likely restructure their arguments in an
effort to characterize damages as economic damages,226 which are not
limited by legislation, thereby dampening the shield's effect. 227 Because
pharmaceutical litigation often involves sympathetic plaintiffs, jurors may
want to punish and "send a message" to the pharmaceutical manufacturer,
even after the FDA has determined that the manufacturer did not withhold
material information that was causally related to the claimant's alleged
injury. This "crossover effect" seems most likely to occur when
questionable business conduct that is not causally related to the plaintiffs
injury is presented to the jury.228
3. Changes in Safety Regulation by the FDA
Perhaps the greatest impact of FDA regulatory compliance defense
legislation will be on the FDA itself. Without the potential regulatory role
of punitive damages in tort litigation, the FDA might become more
conservative during the pre-market drug approval process and more
222. See Green, supra note 120, at 509-10.
223. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (describing critic's concerns about the
self-reporting nature of the FDA regulatory process and tort liability's role in educating the
consumer about drug safety risks).
224. See supra Part I.B.2.a.ii (examining provisions of state statutes and the HEALTH
Act that bar punitive damage when there has been FDA regulatory compliance).
225. See supra Part I.B.2.a.ii-b.
226. See Sharkey, supra note 168, at 493-95 (arguing that caps on noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice cases will have an unintended "crossover effect," thereby dampening
the intended effect of the caps); see also Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d
832, 841 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Many awards of compensatory damages doubtless contain
something of a punitive element, and more would do so if a separate award for exemplary
damages were eliminated.").
227. See HEALTH Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005); see also, N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000).
228. See Rabin, supra note 2, at 2068-69 (quoting Angell, supra note 162, at 60)
(discussing Dow Corning's "dubious business ethics" in the development and marketing of
breast implants).
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aggressive in its labeling requirements. 229 The trick will be for these effects
to strengthen drug safety without stifling innovation or decreasing drug
availability.
CONCLUSION
Despite detailed and comprehensive regulation by the FDA,
pharmaceuticals are co-regulated by lay fact finders who second-guess the
FDA's complex public health decisions. Even if a pharmaceutical
manufacturer fully complied with the FDA's requirements and disclosed
material information related to the plaintiffs alleged injury, jurors are free
to award punitive damages. Although regulatory compliance does not
generally preclude liability, the public's interest in the availability of
pharmaceuticals and the FDA's rigorous regulation, justify departure from
this general rule. Because the FDA regulatory compliance defense to
punitive damages allows injured claimants to be adequately compensated,
and pharmaceuticals are extensively regulated by the FDA, Congress
should pass the HEALTH Act, which contains a provision that precludes
the award of punitive damages absent fraud. Without such a defense to
punitive damages, it is likely the public, in addition to the manufacturer,
that is being punished.
229. See Green, supra note 20, at 190 n.147.
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